Many analysts contend that participation in the Sichuan earthquake relief efforts strengthened Chinese civil society. I examine these claims based on interviews with civil society organizations, academics and local officials in Sichuan, and argue that participation in relief efforts has strengthened civil society through increased capacity, publicity, and interaction with local government. Conversely, relief efforts also reveal weaknesses in civil society and their governing institutions which inhibit further development, such as the trust and capacity deficit of these organizations. Participation in relief efforts served as a learning process whereby government, society and civil society groups learned how to effectively work together. However, in order to consolidate these gains and further strengthen civil society, there must be greater institutionalization of these groups' roles, increased capacity building, and greater trust between society, groups and the local state.
On May 12, 2008 , a massive earthquake struck Sichuan Province (汶川大地震 Wenchuan dadizhen). According to the State Council Information Office, the death toll from the earthquake is approximately 70,000, with a total of 7,000 collapsed classrooms and approximately 10,000 of the nearly 70,000 confirmed deaths were of schoolchildren. 1 Accompanying this tragedy was a significant outpouring of donations and volunteers, leading many analysts to speculate that similar to the SARS crisis in 2003, relief and reconstruction efforts will strengthen civil society in China. 2 According to these arguments, participation in relief efforts increases civil society groups' capacity through an expanded volunteer and donor base, improves experience in project management, and demonstrates to the government the potentially positive role played by civil society.
Additionally, group relief efforts create habits of trust and participation on behalf of the government, potential volunteers, and donors.
In this research report, I analyze these arguments through interviews with civil society groups, academics, journalists, and local government actors in Sichuan province conducted in June and July 2008, supplemented by a review of published articles. These interviewees were selected based on their role in relief efforts-those groups and government agencies participating in relief efforts. The interviewed groups consist of both domestic and international groups, with issue areas ranging from poverty alleviation to environmental concerns. This analysis is vital given the explosion of civil society activity in China in the last few years, albeit many groups with low capacity and effectiveness. 3 Based on my interviews, I argue that participation in relief efforts advanced civil society but also revealed remaining weaknesses that must be resolved for By clearly revealing civil society's strengths and weaknesses, relief efforts served as a learning process for both groups and government. Civil society groups learned how to work in a complementary fashion within government processes, coordinate activities among different civil society groups, and transmit information about their activities and needs to a wider audience through extensive use of the internet and media. Local government officials learned how quickly civil society groups could mobilize resources and how these groups could play a complementary role to government efforts that increased effectiveness and the reach of government resources. Through this learning process, remaining obstacles to the further strengthening of civil society were highlighted, namely trust and capacity weaknesses in civil society and their governing institutions which inhibit further development.
As I discuss in the concluding section of this research report, reforms institutionalizing groups' roles, increasing capacity, and improving trust between society, groups and the local state must be undertaken to consolidate gains and further strengthen civil society.
The pressure for civil society to perform well is high, as poor performance could reverse these gains. First, civil society groups-both international and domestic-and other capacity-building organizations must focus on building human resources and professional skill levels. Second, local groups must also improve their ability to use internet technology and traditional media to increase information about their activities, funding and needs to a broader public, which also improves trust and awareness. And finally, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) must create new laws to govern civil society. Civil society groups need a formal, legal status in the political system, channels to access the policy process, and ability to fundraise domestically. This process of institutionalization, while empowering civil society groups, also allows MOCA to more effectively regulate these groups and normalize their existing place in the Chinese social and political arenas.
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While these are only initial outcomes, it is clear that the cooperation between civil society groups, society and local government initiated a learning process allowing all actors to learn the strengths and weaknesses of the others, and to create a model of local state-civil society cooperation that can be followed again in the future. Civil society is more widely viewed as legitimate in Chinese society which is an important step forward, but these gains must be consolidated through group and institutional reform.
The Development of Civil Society in China
Since the 1980s, many organizations broadly called non-governmental or non-profit organizations (minjianzuzhi 民间组织; shehuituanti 社会团体;feizhengfuzuzhi 非政府组织; feiyinglizuzhi 非营利组织) formed to deliver services and advocate for certain groups in society. These organizations seek to address the concerns of the rural poor, migrants, rural women and other vulnerable groups through service delivery, local capacity building, legal advocacy and policy advocacy. Chinese civil society (公民社会 gongmin shehui) has dramatically increased since the mid 1990s in both the amount of registered groups and in participation numbers. As illustrated below, this associational revolution in China peaked first in 1996. Most of the literature examined below on Chinese civil society was written during this peak period from 1993 until 1996; however, since 1998, civil society has grown even more dramatically. While these statistics do not capture death rates and only measure registered groups, most scholars believe the number of active groups to far exceed the numbers reported by MOCA. 1988  4446  4446  1989  4544  4544  1990  10855  10855  1991  82814  82814  1992  154502 154502  1993  167506 167506  1994  174060 174060  1995  180583 180583  1996  184821 184821  1997  181318 181318  1998  165600 165600  1999  142665 136764  5901  2000  153322 130668  22654  2001  210939 128805  82134  2002  244509 133297  111212  2003  266612 141167  124491 954  2004  289432 153359  135181 892 Due to space limitations, I only briefly outline the past debates on civil society in China.
Increasing participation in social groups in China and the success attributed to civil society movements in the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe led many China scholars to investigate civil society's emergence in the early 1990s. 7 These examinations were based on a model of civil society developed by Jürgen Habermas, positing a public sphere autonomous from the state and composed of groups of voluntary association. Habermas contends that establishing this ideal-type of civil society based on the historical experiences of Western Europe is important as a heuristic for understanding state-society relations. 8 The key criterion for this idealized civil society, one that plays an oppositional role to the state and fosters democracy, is that the associations composing Number of Groups NGO Social Group NPO civil society must be autonomous from the state. If civil society is not autonomous, it cannot allow the democratic will-formation for legitimizing or opposing state action. A public sphere of un-coerced action is necessary for the development of social trust upon which collective action rests. 9 The majority of scholars studying civil society concluded that associations did exist in China that sometimes served to oppose the state, but these associations did not fit Habermas' model in that they were not fully autonomous. 10 In fact, in 1996, a high official in MOCA estimated that less than 50 percent of groups were selforganized, self-supported, and self-governed. 11 Similarly, Chinese and Western analysis of the late 1990s based on autonomy from the state suggested that the majority of groups are semi-governmental. 12 Many scholars critiqued the search for civil society in China as impossible by either imposing a Western state-society model or as attempting to find an autonomous civil society that does not exist. 13 Whereas past research largely found little autonomy from the state, recent research emphasizes the variation in autonomy in both mass and grass-roots organizations.
Several scholars find that as the market transitions from centrally planned to marketbased, workers in mass organizations like the Labor Federation have begun to not only "articulate its interests vis-à-vis the state, but their individual rights vis-à-vis the group." 14 The mass organizations have gradually begun to shift from state corporatism to a role of social representation, leading many to the conclusion that this is an area of emerging civil society in China. 15 Mass organizations are legally dependent on the state, while funding and issue/project decisions are increasingly more independent, leading to a more dynamic role for these organization than imagined under the state corporatism model. In addition to the mass organizations structured by the government, many self-organized or grassroots associations exist to promote members' interests in business, professional and social realms. There is great variation in the legal status of these associations, many of them are registered as social organizations (minjian zuzhi 民间组织), but many are unofficially associated with a university or operate informally. Howell contends that since the early 1990s, the creation of new forms of associations such as networks, centers, user groups, and projects can bypass the need for registration; however, the group's intentions still matter-if the group appears to have political goals the state will repress the group, but if the group appears beneficial local officials especially will cast a blind eye towards registration. 16 Besides variation in legal autonomy, many groups rely on a diversity of funding, such as grants from INGOs (international non-governmental organizations), foundations, international organizations, foreign governments and businesses, and the Chinese government. This diversity of funding suggests that civil society organizations have some autonomy from the state. For example, recent research highlights that private business associations (shanghui 商会) are funded through membership dues and independently select issues to advance. Despite past analyses which questioned the ability of these groups to sustain collective action due to the lack of common identity among entrepreneurs, recently Scott Kennedy finds that membership in these groups is increasingly creating a common identity. 17 Kennedy argues that economic reforms created incentives for businesspeople to defend their interests, often by joining associations, but also by direct lobbying. Kennedy finds that these associations are primarily voluntary, increasingly financially independent, not ordered hierarchically, and not unchallenged representatives of certain interests. 18 While Kennedy finds that these groups secure their own funding and develop their own issue agendas, he argues that a focus on civil society as autonomous from the state privileges separation as being more important than access to challenge the state, as well as privileging organized political action.
Similarly cultural organizations in China, one of the largest growing group categories, are composed of voluntary membership depending in large part on dues or donations. This category consists of groups organized to protect and promote cultural practices such as ethnic music, ethnic history/tradition, religion, traditional music or literature, and martial arts. These groups are increasingly popular, and are autonomous from the government although in some instances they might receive funding for a particular project from the local government. Lily Tsai recently explored how these groups actively seek to provide public goods and services to community members, using embedded relationships such as kinship ties. 19 As recent research illustrates, civil society in China-NGOs, private business associations and cultural groups-exercise varying degrees of autonomy through registration status, funding sources and in project decisions. 20 In the past, analyses of civil society in China often relied on this dichotomous understanding of societal autonomy-civil society must either be completely autonomous similar to the Habermasian model, or completely co-opted similar to the state corporatism model. While many scholars contend that state corporatism no longer best describes
Chinese state-society relationship, many also contend that Chinese state-society relationships also do not fit into a Habermasian model. 21 This leaves us with an obvious dilemma which is that using group autonomy to define the model of state-society relationships is inconclusive when group autonomy varies greatly. Analyzing the role played by civil society in post-earthquake relief efforts allows us to trace this gradual development of civil society in China. As I discuss below, I first examine how relief efforts serve as a learning process for both civil society and local government, and then outline how civil society uses a strategy of cooperation with the local state to meet its service dfelivery and advocacy goals.
Participation without Formal Institutions
Immediately after the extent of earthquake devastation became clear, the Chinese Red
Cross was able to quickly organize an action plan and receive government approval, but many local NGOs and INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) were not sure how best to deliver assistance or how to coordinate their activities with each other and the local government. Thus groups were unable to coherently assist the relief efforts, had difficulty in gaining access to disaster areas, and duplicated other groups' efforts.
While many groups, such as the Western Volunteers Association (西部志愿者 Xibu Zhiyuanzhe), have extensive networks of volunteers, they did not have the organizational capacity to mobilize and conduct relief efforts.
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To resolve these problems, the founders of the Chengdu Urban Rivers Research Group Despite this influx of aid, many of these domestic donations were not completely voluntary. Lists of how much each company, agency, and famous individual donated were publicly available on television and in most major newspapers. For example, basketball star Yao Ming was criticized in the media and online forums for offering half a million yuan donation which was not viewed as sufficient; in response, he quadrupled his donation. 35 At some companies, bosses also publicized names of employees who donated along with the amount donated. 36 The public pressure to donate large amounts was high, and many companies feared boycotts if not seen as generous in their giving.
Additionally, most donations go directly to the local government or the Chinese Red
Cross, and not to local civil society organizations. Although civil society groups have captured additional financial resources with which to assist in relief efforts, the majority of these resources is not voluntary and is not flowing through these groups, meaning that these lines of financing will not remain open in the future. Both of these factors raise serious questions as to the creation of a philanthropic corporate or social base that will increase future civil society capacity.
Analysts argue that relief efforts dramatically increased the human and financial resources of these groups, allowing them to play a larger role than many expected. 37 The volunteer base has significantly increased post-earthquake; however, most of these volunteers are student volunteers with little training and a lack of professional experience. Another common criticism is that these groups have little experience with relief efforts and do not have professionally trained project managers, which led to poorly coordinated initial relief efforts. 38 For example, many groups were not accustomed to cooperating with other groups or local government, and had conflicts with servicedelivery methods and the government decision-making process. 39 Many civil society professionals and academics recounted stories of groups that would turn away volunteers and donations simply because the group did not have the trained staff or work processes to handle them: "A local doctor called a civil society group he had heard was participating in relief efforts and offered to volunteer, but the group did not know how to deploy his skills so asked him to buy some water instead. Even though a doctor would have been useful, they couldn't make use of him." 40 The inability of civil society groups to manage the financial and human resources available illustrates the lack of skilled project managers and institutionalized processes of auditing, project management, and volunteer training. Additionally, as I discuss below, prospective volunteers and donors often bypassed civil society groups, reflecting a lack of trust and doubts of group capacity on the part of citizens and corporations. However, it is unclear that habits of donations were inculcated that would continue to fund these groups after reconstruction efforts. Additionally, there remain many questions as to the capacity of these groups to effectively manage projects, especially regarding auditing and staffing practices. Therefore, while participation in relief efforts advanced group capacity in identifying funding sources and providing on-the-job training for staff in project management and accounting, significant capacity weaknesses remain in these areas that must be addressed in order for civil society to progress.
The Trust Deficit of Chinese Civil Society: Mobilizing Society
The presence of what many analysts are calling "informal civil society," meaning spontaneous unorganized social action, illustrates the difficulty for many groups in mobilizing society outside of existing networks. 41 A common explanation for why so many donors and volunteers bypassed existing civil society organizations is that these groups are seen as ineffective: "This kind of civil society, based not around formal organisations but around issues, can mobilise more people." 42 Another explanation is that corporations and citizens do not trust these groups, as evidenced by low trust levels in the World Values Surveys in China. 43 As one interviewee noted, "If an ordinary (老百姓 laobaixing) Chinese gives 100 kuai to a group, he wants to see that group spend 100 kuai on the activity. If the group uses any of that money for administrative costs, the ordinary Chinese thinks that is corruption." 44 Because trust for civil society is low and many doubt groups' capacity to undertake this work, a great deal of the donations and volunteers were not an organized response, but rather a spontaneous one to the tragedy.
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While many older Chinese embrace what they see as the younger generation's return to traditions of community assistance from the materialism of the last two decades, this type of social action does not strengthen but rather undermines civil society. 46 If social action takes place outside of organized civil society, these groups will find it difficult to increase their capacity or social trust levels.
Despite the presence of unorganized participation, many analysts argue that relief efforts created a strong volunteer base for civil society through feelings of social responsibility and habits of volunteering. As Jia Xijin, a scholar at the school of public policy and management at Tsinghua University explains, "It's good news for civil society. People are aware of their social responsibility." 47 Reporters described the outpouring of volunteer efforts as "the whole country seemed to mobilize for relief work, showing the generosity and sense of duty expected in a civil society. Thousands of volunteers went to the quake zone, and tens of billions in cash has poured into Sichuan Province. People queued at blood donation vehicles, and many are seeking to adopt quake orphans."
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Civil society groups actively worked to mobilize volunteers and donors, and while many participated through informal civil society, the unorganized volunteers and donations once arriving in Sichuan, were managed and coordinated by groups. As one government official observed, "All of these volunteers, money and materials flooded into the disaster zones. Anyone who had a van was trying to deliver materials to these places. It got very chaotic as the troops who were supposed to be doing relief efforts ended up taking care of the unorganized volunteers. Finally we asked the Red Cross and the NGO Relief Center to supervise these spontaneous volunteers and donations." 49 Groups trained and coordinated these volunteers, and developed a strong volunteer base for the future.
50
Many of these volunteers were college students; however, there were also a number of young professionals who had never volunteered or interacted with civil society. While it is too early to tell if habits of volunteering and donating were internalized, participation in relief efforts (and perhaps also with the Olympics) created a more trained, diverse and socially responsible potential volunteer base.
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In addition to expanding their volunteer base, many groups who previously had not mobilized their networks of members-such as online clubs-learned how to mobilize members across great distances. For example, the Mothers Network (妈妈论坛 mama luntan), an online group of mothers who routinely discuss issues concerning children, mobilized in response to the earthquake and quickly gathered money and supplies from members. 52 One example of their relief efforts was to collect donated books and deliver them to the temporary schools established in the disaster areas. This case is particularly interesting given the explosion of online communities in China. Most analyses of civil society in political science ignore these groups or online clubs because they are formed for purely social reasons, not political ones, and do not occupy space in the physical world. However, in China these networks which form for social reasons can become politically relevant when a particular issue catches the membership's attention. The earthquake caused the members of the Mothers Network to provide relief efforts and discuss the issues facing the orphans and school children, as well as motivating the members to meet in person for the first time. The use of information technology dramatically increases the capacity of these groups, and shows the strong potential mobilization power of these organizations, even online clubs, especially over different regions. 53 This example illustrates the growth and potential strength of civil society;
however, this type of mobilization plays on government fears of spontaneous social mobilization not directed by the party. Although civil society, including online clubs, demonstrated the ability to mobilize new volunteers, the presence of unorganized participation illustrates the remaining trust and capacity deficit of these groups.
The Trust Deficit of Chinese Civil Society: Local Government Interaction
In addition to low levels of trust for civil society among the general population, local government in Sichuan also revealed distrust for these groups' intentions. The key doubt that many local officials possessed was succinctly summarized by one cadre: "if their funding is from overseas, what are the true motives of this group?" While one fear is that these groups intend to oppose the government, the more immediate fear is that groups want to substitute for government, and through this substitution reduce local government power and authority. Local officials feel threatened that the strengthening of civil society might create social disorder and erode their own power and authority, but also that many in the international community and at the central government view these groups as a substitute to local government. They feel threatened that people outside their province view their work as of poor quality and believe that civil society groups could do this work better. As one cadre explained, "Why would people say that local government has low capacity or doesn't understand the needs of our people? We are very professional and are However, it is uncertain if these models will be extended to the rest of China due to fears of social disorder in the current political context. After the Tibetan protests in March 2008, MOCA worried about groups using international funding to oppose certain government policies and create social unrest. This worry was further heightened by angry parents protesting over school collapses after the earthquake. 64 As social unrest increased, local government pressured civil society organizations to not interact with parents. 65 MOCA is uncertain if groups would continue to play a social mediation role similar to the one during relief efforts, or a social mobilization role in opposition of government goals.
Implications for Strengthening Chinese Civil Society
Although earthquake relief efforts strengthened civil society in many ways, it also revealed problematic institutional and group weaknesses that must be remedied before civil society is truly strengthened. 66 Necessary reforms to improve the trust and capacity deficit of civil society organizations are increasing the trust of both government and society, strengthening auditing procedures, improving human resource capacity, and reforming laws about social group status, role in the policy process, donations, and registration.
First, civil society groups and international capacity-building organizations must focus on building human resources and professional skill levels. Groups need to build capacity specifically in transparent auditing processes and in professional NPO management skills, especially project management. While many capacity building projects are currently underway in China, this area must receive more funding and attention. Second, in order to increase trust levels of civil society, groups must publicize their activities and work processes. Many people in society and government do not understand how these groups conduct projects or what their goals are in society. In addition to this ignorance, many also distrust groups that are viewed as foreign proxies. Groups need to learn how to use online platforms and media to broadcast their existence and activities in order to increase the knowledge of and trust in these organizations, similar to the platforms maintained by environmental groups. 67 Groups often do not advertise their activities for fear of the government increasing monitoring; however, this publicity is necessary to increase exposure, legitimacy and trust.
Third, MOCA must reform laws about social group status, role in the policy process, donations, and registration. Current regulations maintain costly and difficult registration procedures that most civil society groups do not understand, do not allow domestic fundraising except for certain registered charities, and also do not legitimize a role for these groups in either the social or political life of China. 68 The government needs to alter rules on registration and fundraising to match the reality on the ground witnessed during earthquake relief efforts. 69 One way to reform current laws about domestic fundraising is to develop an independent "social auditing agency" to ensure that groups handle donations properly. However, many experts argue that MOCA is wary of institutionalizing the role of nongovernmental organizations, giving them a role that could grow and provide a counterweight to the one-party state, especially since the color revolutions: "The government is a little worried. The traditional way people participated in the past is through their work unit or through the party system. Now, other groups are arising to fulfill a social need." 70 However, in response to the development of civil society MOCA has created a new NGO management office, headed by a PhD who studied civil society at Tsinghua University, which is considering how best to reform the current laws. 71 Additionally, an even more difficult reform is how to institutionalize a role for these groups that allows these groups to play a beneficial role in society while establishing effective government supervision. One reform that is being piloted is a participatory budgeting process at the local level, which allows civil society groups to play an advocacy or voice role in the policy process.
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By clearly revealing civil society's strengths and weaknesses, relief efforts served as a learning process which highlighted obstacles to the further strengthening of civil society, namely trust and capacity weaknesses in civil society and their governing institutions which inhibit further development. Thus reforms institutionalizing groups' roles, increasing capacity, and improving trust between society, groups and the local state must be undertaken to consolidate gains and further strengthen civil society. However, participation in relief efforts strengthened civil society by increasing cooperation between civil society groups, society and local government creating a model of local state-civil society cooperation that can be used in the future.
Civil society in China is clearly playing an increasingly independent and important role in both service delivery and policy advocacy. The case of post-earthquake relief efforts illustrates that civil society in China acts like civil society in many democracies, by identifying social needs, developing projects to address these unmet needs, and mobilizing resources from state, society and market. Despite using a local state-civil society cooperation model, civil society is acting independently and is not simply being coopted by the state. In fact, much of the cooperation was designed by civil society groups and imposed on the local government through international and domestic pressure. I find that this cooperation model is similar to the strategies used by many other civil society groups in China. 73 While this case illustrates the significant independent role of civil society in China, it also reveals the remaining obstacles to further development.
